

CS:4420 Artificial Intelligence

Spring 2019

First-Order Logic

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Readings

- Chap. 8 of [Russell and Norvig, 3rd Edition]

Knowledge Representation and Logic

Recall:

The field of **Mathematical Logic** provides powerful, formal knowledge representation languages and inference systems to build reasoning agents

We will consider two languages, and associated inference systems, from mathematical logic:

- **Propositional Logic**
- **First-order Logic**

Pros and cons of Propositional Logic

- + PL is **declarative**: pieces of syntax correspond to facts
- + PL allows partial/disjunctive/negated information (unlike most data structures and databases)
- + Propositional logic is **compositional**:
meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$
- + Meaning in propositional logic is **context-independent** (unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)
- Propositional logic has very limited expressive power (unlike natural language)
E.g., cannot say “pits cause breezes in adjacent squares” except by writing one sentence for each square

First-order Logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains **facts**, first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

- **Objects**: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries, ...
- **Relations**: red, round, bogus, prime, brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, ...
- **Functions**: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of, ...

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constant symbols	<i>KingJohn, 2, Potus, [], ...</i>
Relation symbols	<i>Brothers(-,-), - > -, Red(-), ...</i>
Function symbols	<i>Sqrt(-), LeftLegOf(-), - + -, ...</i>
Variables	<i>x, y, a, b, ...</i>
Connectives	$\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$
Equality	$=$
Quantifiers	$\forall \exists$

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence = $relation(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or $term_1 = term_2$

Term = $function(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g., $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart),$

$Length(LeftLegOf(RobinHood)) > Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn))$

Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

E.g. $Siblings(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Siblings(Richard, KingJohn)$

$$x > 2 \vee 1 < x$$

$$1 > 2 \wedge \neg y > 2$$

Language of FOL: Grammar

Sentence	::=	AtomicS ComplexS
AtomicS	::=	True False RelSymb(Term, ...) Term = Term
ComplexS	::=	(Sentence) Sentence Connective Sentence \neg Sentence Quantifier Sentence
Term	::=	FunSymb(Term, ...) ConstSymb Variable
Connective	::=	\wedge \vee \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow
Quantifier	::=	\forall Variable \exists Variable
Variable	::=	<i>a</i> <i>b</i> ... <i>x</i> <i>y</i> ...
ConstSymb	::=	<i>A</i> <i>B</i> ... <i>John</i> <i>0</i> <i>1</i> ... π ...
FunSymb	::=	<i>F</i> <i>G</i> ... <i>Cosine</i> <i>Height</i> <i>FatherOf</i> <i>+</i> ...
RelSymb	::=	<i>P</i> <i>Q</i> ... <i>Red</i> <i>Brother</i> <i>Apple</i> <i>></i> ...

Truth in FOL

Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**

A model contains ≥ 1 objects (**domain elements**) and relations and functions over them

An interpretation specifies referents for

variables \rightarrow objects


constant symbols \rightarrow objects

predicate symbols \rightarrow relations

function symbols \rightarrow functional relations

An atomic sentence $P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ is true in an interpretation iff the objects referred to by t_1, \dots, t_n are in the relation referred to by P

Models for FOL: Example



Truth example

Consider the interpretation in which

Richard → Richard the Lionheart

John → the evil King John

Brother → the brotherhood relation

Under this interpretation, *Brother(Richard, John)* is true just in case Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John are in the brotherhood relation in the model

Semantics of First-Order Logic

(A little) more formally:

An *interpretation* \mathcal{I} is a pair (\mathcal{D}, σ) where


- \mathcal{D} is a set of objects, the universe (or *domain*)
- σ is mapping from variables to objects in \mathcal{D}
- $c^{\mathcal{I}}$ is an object in \mathcal{D} for every constant symbol c
- $f^{\mathcal{I}}$ is a function from \mathcal{D}^n to \mathcal{D} for every function symbol f of arity n
- $r^{\mathcal{I}}$ is a relation over \mathcal{D}^n for every relation symbol r of arity n

An Interpretation \mathcal{I} in the Blocks World

Constant Symbols: A, B, C, D, E, T

Function Symbols: $Support$

Relation Symbols: $On, Above, Clear$



$$A^{\mathcal{I}} = a, B^{\mathcal{I}} = b, C^{\mathcal{I}} = c, D^{\mathcal{I}} = d, E^{\mathcal{I}} = e, T^{\mathcal{I}} = t$$

$$Support^{\mathcal{I}} = \{\langle a, b \rangle, \langle b, c \rangle, \langle c, t \rangle, \langle d, e \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle, \langle t, t \rangle\}$$

$$On^{\mathcal{I}} = \{\langle a, b \rangle, \langle b, c \rangle, \langle c, t \rangle, \langle d, e \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle\}$$

$$Above^{\mathcal{I}} = \{\langle a, b \rangle, \langle a, c \rangle, \langle a, t \rangle, \dots\}$$

$$Clear^{\mathcal{I}} = \{\langle a \rangle, \langle d \rangle\}$$

Semantics of First-Order Logic

Let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ be an interpretation and E an expression of FOL

We write $\llbracket e \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$ to denote the *meaning of e in \mathcal{I}*

The meaning $\llbracket t \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$ of a term t is an object of \mathcal{D} , inductively defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket x \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} &:= \sigma(x) && \text{for all variables } x \\ \llbracket c \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} &:= c^{\mathcal{I}} && \text{for all constant symbols } c \\ \llbracket f(t_1, \dots, t_n) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} &:= f^{\mathcal{I}}(\llbracket t_1 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}, \dots, \llbracket t_n \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}) && \text{for all } n\text{-ary function symbols } f \end{aligned}$$

Example

Consider the symbols *MotherOf*, *SpouseOf* and the interpretation $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ where

MotherOf ^{\mathcal{I}} is a unary fn mapping people to their mother

SpouseOf ^{\mathcal{I}} is a unary fn mapping people to their spouse

$$\sigma := \{x \mapsto \text{Bart}, y \mapsto \text{Homer}, \dots\}$$

What is the meaning of *SpouseOf*(*MotherOf*(*x*)) in \mathcal{I} ?

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \text{SpouseOf}(\text{MotherOf}(x)) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} &= \text{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\llbracket \text{MotherOf}(x) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}) \\ &= \text{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\text{MotherOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\llbracket x \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}})) \\ &= \text{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\text{MotherOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\sigma(x))) \\ &= \text{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\text{MotherOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\text{Bart})) \\ &= \text{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\text{Marge}) \\ &= \text{Homer} \end{aligned}$$

Semantics of First-Order Logic

Let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ be an interpretation

The meaning $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$ of a formula φ is either *True* or *False*

It is inductively defined as follows:

$\llbracket t_1 = t_2 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$	$:=$	<i>True</i>	iff	$\llbracket t_1 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$ is the same as $\llbracket t_2 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$
$\llbracket r(t_1, \dots, t_n) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$	$:=$	<i>True</i>	iff	$\langle \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}, \dots, \llbracket t_n \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} \rangle \in r^{\mathcal{I}}$
$\llbracket \neg \varphi \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$	$:=$	<i>True/False</i>	iff	$\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} = \text{False/True}$
$\llbracket \varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$	$:=$	<i>True</i>	iff	$\llbracket \varphi_1 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} = \text{True}$ or $\llbracket \varphi_2 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} = \text{True}$
$\llbracket \exists x \varphi \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}}$	$:=$	<i>True</i>	iff	$\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_{\sigma'}^{\mathcal{I}} = \text{True}$ for some σ' that disagrees with σ at most on x

Semantics of First-Order Logic

Let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ be an interpretation

The meaning of formulas built with the other logical symbols:

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} &:= \llbracket \neg(\neg\varphi_1 \vee \neg\varphi_2) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} \\ \llbracket \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} &:= \llbracket \neg\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} \\ \llbracket \varphi_1 \Leftrightarrow \varphi_2 \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} &:= \llbracket (\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2) \wedge (\varphi_2 \Rightarrow \varphi_1) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} \\ \llbracket \forall x \varphi \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} &:= \llbracket \neg \exists x \neg \varphi \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} \end{aligned}$$

If a sentence is *closed*, i.e., it has no *free* variables, its meaning **does not depend** on the the variable assignment—although it may depend on the domain:

$$\llbracket \forall x \exists y R(x, y) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} = \llbracket \forall x \exists y R(x, y) \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}'} \quad \text{for any } \mathcal{I}' = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma')$$

Models, Validity, etc. for Sentences

An interpretation $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ *satisfies* a sentence φ , or is a *model of* φ , if $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^{\mathcal{I}} = \text{True}$

A sentence is *satisfiable* if it has at least one model

$$\text{Ex: } \forall x x \geq y, \quad P(x)$$

A sentence is *unsatisfiable* if it has no models

$$\text{Ex: } P(x) \wedge \neg P(x), \quad \neg(x = x), \quad (\forall x Q(x, y)) \Rightarrow \neg Q(a, b)$$

A sentence φ is *valid* if every interpretation is a model of it

$$\text{Ex: } P(x) \Rightarrow P(x), \quad x = x, \quad (\forall x P(x)) \Rightarrow \exists x P(x)$$

Note: φ is *valid/unsatisfiable* iff $\neg\varphi$ is *unsatisfiable/valid*

Models, Validity, etc. for Sets of Sentences

An interpretation (\mathcal{D}, σ) *satisfies* a set Γ of sentences, or is a *model of* Γ , if it is a model for every sentence in Γ

A set Γ of sentences is *satisfiable* if it has at least one model

$$\text{Ex: } \{\forall x x \geq 0, \forall x x + 1 > x\}$$

Γ is *unsatisfiable*, or *inconsistent*, if it has no models

$$\text{Ex: } \{P(x), \neg P(x)\}$$

Γ *entails* a sentence φ ($\Gamma \models \varphi$), if every model for Γ is also a model for φ

$$\text{Ex: } \{\forall x P(x) \Rightarrow Q(x), P(A_{10})\} \models Q(A_{10})$$

Note: As in propositional logic, $\Gamma \models \varphi$ iff $\Gamma \wedge \neg\varphi$ is unsatisfiable

Possible Interpretations Semantics

Sentences can be seen as **constraints** on the set S of all possible interpretations.

A sentence **denotes** all the possible interpretations that satisfy it (the models of φ):

If φ_1 denotes a set of interpretations S_1 and φ_2 denotes a set S_2 , then

- $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$ denotes $S_1 \cup S_2$,
- $\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ denotes $S_1 \cap S_2$,
- $\neg\varphi_1$ denotes $S \setminus S_1$,
- $\varphi_1 \models \varphi_2$ iff $S_1 \subseteq S_2$.

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Note 1: A sentence denotes either no interpretations or an infinite number of them!

Note 2: Valid sentences do not tell us anything about the world. They are satisfied by every possible interpretation!

Models for FOL: Lots!

We **can enumerate** the models for a given FOL sentence:

For each number of universe elements n from 1 to ∞

 For each k -ary predicate P_k in the sentence

 For each possible k -ary relation on n objects

 For each constant symbol C in the sentence

 For each one of n objects mapped to C

 ...

Enumerating models is not going to be easy!

Universal quantification

$\forall \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$

Everyone at Berkeley is smart:

$\forall x \text{ At}(x, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$

$\forall x P$ is true in an interpretation \mathcal{I} iff P is true with x being each possible object in \mathcal{I} 's domain

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

$(\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn}))$
 $\wedge (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Richard}))$
 $\wedge (\text{At}(\text{Berkeley}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Berkeley}))$
 $\wedge \dots$

Existential quantification

$\exists \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$

Someone at Stanford is smart:

$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$

$\exists x P$ is true in an interpretation \mathcal{I} iff P is true with x being **some** possible object in \mathcal{I} 's domain

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of P

$(\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn}))$
 $\vee (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Richard}))$
 $\vee (\text{At}(\text{Stanford}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Stanford}))$
 $\vee \dots$

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \forall y \varphi$ is equivalent to $\forall y \forall x \varphi$ (why?)

$\exists x \exists y \varphi$ is equivalent to $\exists y \exists x \varphi$ (why?)

$\exists x \forall y \varphi$ is **not** equivalent to $\forall y \exists x \varphi$

Ex.

$\exists x \forall y \text{Loves}(x, y)$

“There is a person who loves everyone in the world”

$\forall y \exists x \text{Loves}(x, y)$

“Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \neg \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$

$\exists x \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \neg \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

From English prepositions to FOL connectives

English	Logic
A and B A but B	$A \wedge B$
A if B A when B A whenever B	$B \Rightarrow A$
if A, then B A implies B A forces B	$A \Rightarrow B$
only if A, B B only if A	$B \Rightarrow A$
A precisely when B A if and only if B	$B \Leftrightarrow A$ $A \Leftrightarrow B$
A or B (or both) A unless B	$A \vee B$ (logical or)
either A or B (but not both)	$A \oplus B$ (exclusive or)

A common mistake to avoid

Typically, \Rightarrow is the main connective with \forall

Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$$\forall x \text{ } At(x, Berkeley) \wedge Smart(x)$$

means “Everyone is at Berkeley and everyone is smart”

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Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$$\forall x \text{ } At(x, Berkeley) \wedge Smart(x)$$

means “Everyone is at Berkeley and everyone is smart”

Compare with

$$\forall x \text{ } At(x, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$$

“Everyone at Berkeley is smart”

Another common mistake to avoid

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Common mistake: using \Rightarrow as the main connective with \exists :

$$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Stanford}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$$

is true if there is anyone who is not at Stanford!

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Common mistake: using \Rightarrow as the main connective with \exists :

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Compare with

$$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$$

“Someone at Stanford is smart”

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

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$$\forall x, y \text{ Siblings}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Siblings}(y, x)$$

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One's mother is one's female parent

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One's mother is one's female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y))$$

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$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y))$$

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

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$$\forall x, y \text{ Siblings}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Siblings}(y, x)$$

One’s mother is one’s female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y))$$

A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x_1, x_2 \text{ FirstCousin}(x_1, x_2) \Leftrightarrow \\ \exists p_1, p_2 \text{ Siblings}(p_1, p_2) \wedge \text{Parent}(p_1, x_1) \wedge \text{Parent}(p_2, x_2) \end{aligned}$$

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Dogs are mammals

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

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“Siblings” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Siblings}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Siblings}(y, x)$$

One’s mother is one’s female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y))$$

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$$\begin{aligned} \forall x_1, x_2 \text{ FirstCousin}(x_1, x_2) \Leftrightarrow \\ \exists p_1, p_2 \text{ Siblings}(p_1, p_2) \wedge \text{Parent}(p_1, x_1) \wedge \text{Parent}(p_2, x_2) \end{aligned}$$

Dogs are mammals

$$\forall x \text{ Dog}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Mammal}(x)$$

Equality

Recall that $t_1 = t_2$ is true under a given interpretation if and only if t_1 and t_2 refer to the same object

E.g., $1 = 2$ and $x * x = x$ are satisfiable
 $2 = 2$ is valid

E.g., definition of (full) *Sibling* in terms of *Parent*:

$$\forall x, y \text{ Siblings}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \neg(m = f) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, y) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, y)]$$

More fun with sentences

1. No one is his/her own sibling
2. Sisters are female, brothers are male
3. Every one is male or female but not both
4. Every married person has a spouse
5. Married people have spouses
6. Only married people have spouses
7. People cannot be married to their siblings
8. Not everybody has a spouse
9. Everybody has a mother
10. Everybody has a mother and only one

More fun with sentences

1. $\forall x \neg Siblings(x, x)$
2. $\forall x, y (Sisters(x, y) \Rightarrow Female(x) \wedge Female(y)) \wedge$
 $(Brothers(x, y) \Rightarrow Male(x) \wedge Male(y))$
3. $\forall x Person(x) \Rightarrow (Male(x) \vee Female(x)) \wedge$
 $\neg(Male(x) \wedge Female(x))$
4. $\forall x (Person(x) \wedge Married(x)) \Rightarrow \exists y Spouse(x, y)$
5. $\forall x (Person(x) \wedge Married(x)) \Rightarrow \exists y Spouse(x, y)$
6. $\forall x, y (Person(x) \wedge Person(y) \wedge Spouse(x, y)) \Rightarrow Married(x) \wedge Married(y)$
7. $\forall x, y Spouse(x, y) \Rightarrow \neg Siblings(x, y)$
8. $\neg \forall x Person(x) \Rightarrow \exists y Spouse(x, y)$
Alter.: $\exists x Person(x) \wedge \neg \exists y Spouse(x, y)$
9. $\forall x Person(x) \Rightarrow \exists y Mother(y, x)$
10. $\forall x Person(x) \Rightarrow \exists y Mother(y, x) \wedge$
 $\neg \exists z \neg(y = z) \wedge Mother(z, x)$