

Abstract DPLL and Abstract DPLL Modulo Theories

Robert Nieuwenhuis*, Albert Oliveras*, and Cesare Tinelli **

Abstract. We introduce *Abstract DPLL*, a general and simple abstract rule-based formulation of the Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) procedure. Its properties, such as soundness, completeness or termination, immediately carry over to the modern DPLL implementations with features such as non-chronological backtracking or clause learning. This allows one to formally reason about practical DPLL algorithms in a simple way. In the second part of this paper we extend the framework to *Abstract DPLL modulo theories*. This allows us to express—and formally reason about—state-of-the-art concrete DPLL-based techniques for satisfiability modulo background theories, such as the different *lazy* approaches, or our DPLL(T) framework.

1 Introduction

Most state-of-the-art SAT solvers [MMZ⁺01,GN02] today are based on different variations of the Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) procedure [DP60,DLL62], a procedure for deciding the satisfiability of propositional formulas in conjunctive normal form.

Starting essentially with the pioneering work on the GRASP [MSS99] and SATO [Zha97] systems, the spectacular improvements in the performance of DPLL-based SAT solvers achieved in the last years are due to i) better implementation techniques, such as, e.g., the *2-watched literal* approach for unit propagation, and ii) several conceptual enhancements on the original DPLL procedure aimed at reducing the amount of explored search space such as *non-chronological backtracking*, *conflict-driven lemma learning*, and *restarts*.

Because of their success, both the DPLL procedure and its enhancements have been recently adapted to satisfiability problems in more expressive logics than propositional logic. In particular, they have been used to build efficient solvers for the satisfiability of (certain classes of) ground first-order formulas with respect to theories like the theory of equality, of the integer/real numbers, of arrays, and on [ACG00,ABC⁺02,BDS02,dMR02,FJOS03,GHN⁺04].

Altogether, it has become non-trivial to reason formally about the properties of such enhanced DPLL procedures and their extensions to satisfiability modulo

* Tech. Univ. of Catalonia, Barcelona www.lsi.upc.es/~roberto|oliveras. Both these authors partially supported by the Spanish MCYT project TIC2001-2476-C03-01 and Oliveras by FPU grant AP2002-3533 from the Spanish MEC D Ministry.

** Dept. of Computer Science, The University of Iowa, www.cs.uiowa.edu/~tinelli. Partially supported by Grant No. 237422 from the National Science Foundation.

theories (SMT). However, so far there have been no attempts to do so in the literature, to our knowledge at least, except for a work by Tinelli [Tin02] (one of these authors). That work describes DPLL and DPLL modulo theories at an abstract, formal level by means of a sequent-style logical calculus. This calculus consists of a few deterministic derivation rules, modelling the constraint propagation mechanism of the DPLL procedure, and one branching rule, modelling the non-deterministic guessing step of DPLL. Because of the branching rule the calculus produces *derivation trees*. As a consequence, it can explicitly model neither backtracking (chronological or not) nor lemma learning—they are metalogical features for the calculus. Also, the calculus implicitly assumes the procedure to keep track of the current truth values of all clauses, which is not the case in practical implementations.

In this paper we address these limitations of Tinelli’s calculus by modelling the DPLL procedure and its SMT extensions as *transitions systems*. While still as declarative in nature as the calculus in [Tin02], our transition systems can explicitly model various features of state-of-the-art DPLL-based solvers, thus bridging the gap between abstract calculi for DPLL and actual implementations.

In Section 2, using transition systems defined by means of conditional transition rules, we introduce general and simple abstract formulations of several variants of propositional DPLL, and discuss their soundness, completeness, and termination. These properties immediately carry over to modern DPLL implementations with such features as non-chronological backtracking and learning. In fact, we also explain and formalize what is done by the different implementations. For example, we explain how different systems implement our backjumping rule, how devices such as implication graphs are just one possibility for computing new lemmas, and how standard backtracking is a special case of the backjumping rule.

We also provide a general and simple termination argument for DPLL procedures that does not depend on an exhaustive enumeration of all truth assignments; instead, it cleanly expresses that a search state becomes more advanced if an additional unit is deduced, the higher up in the search tree the better—which is the very essence of the idea of backjumping.

Our transition systems allow one to formally reason about practical DPLL implementations in a simple way, which to our knowledge had not been done before. In Section 3 we extend the framework to *Abstract DPLL modulo theories*. This allows us to express—and formally reason about—most state-of-the-art DPLL-based techniques for satisfiability modulo background theories, such as various so called *lazy* approaches [ACG00,ABC⁺02,BDS02,dMR02,FJOS03] and our own DPLL(T) framework [GHN⁺04].

2 The Abstract DPLL Procedure

The DPLL procedure works by trying to build incrementally a satisfying truth assignment for a given propositional formula F in conjunctive normal form. At each step, the current assignment M for F is augmented either by a process of *boolean constraint propagation*, which deduces deterministically from M and F the truth value of additional variables of F , or by a non-deterministic guess, or *decision*, on the truth value of one of the remaining undefined variables.

Modern implementations of DPLL use efficient constraint propagation algorithms, and sophisticated backtracking mechanisms for recovering from wrong decisions. We provide here a general abstract framework for describing both constraint propagation and backtracking in DPLL-based systems.

In this section we deal with propositional logic. Atoms are propositional symbols from a finite set P . If $p \in P$, then p is a *positive* literal and $\neg p$ is a *negative* literal. The *negation* of a literal l , written $\neg l$, denotes $\neg p$ if l is p , and p if l is $\neg p$. A *clause* is a set of literals and a *cnf* (formula) is a set of clauses. A (partial truth) *assignment* M is a set of literals such that $\{p, \neg p\} \subseteq M$ for no p . A literal l is *true* in M if $l \in M$, is *false* in M if $\neg l \in M$, and is *undefined* otherwise. M is *total* if no literal of P is undefined in M . A clause C is true in M if $C \cap M \neq \emptyset$, is false in M , denoted $M \models \neg C$, if all its literals are false in M , and is undefined otherwise. A cnf F is true in M (or satisfied by M), denoted $M \models F$, if all its clauses are true in M . In that case, M is called a *model* of F . If F has no models then it is *unsatisfiable*. We write $F \models C$ ($F \models F'$) if the clause C (cnf F') is true in all models of F . If $F \models F'$ and $F' \models F$, we say that F and F' are logically equivalent. We denote by $C \vee l$ the clause D such that $l \in D$ and $C = D \setminus \{l\}$.

2.1 The Basic DPLL Procedure

Here, a DPLL procedure will be modeled by a *transition system*: a set of *states* together with a relation, called the *transition relation*, over these states. States will be denoted by (possibly subscripted) S . We write $S \Longrightarrow S'$ to mean that the pair (S, S') is in the transition relation, and then say that S' is *reachable* from S in one *transition step*. We denote by \Longrightarrow^* the reflexive-transitive closure of \Longrightarrow . We write $S \Longrightarrow^! S'$ if $S \Longrightarrow^* S'$ and S' is a *final* state, i.e., if $S' \Longrightarrow S''$ for no S'' .

A state is either *fail* or a pair $M \parallel F$, where F is a finite set of clauses and M is a sequence of *annotated literals*. We will denote the empty sequence of literals by \emptyset , unit sequences by their only literal, and the concatenation of two sequences by simple juxtaposition. We will not go into a complete formalization of annotated literals; it suffices to know that some literals l will be annotated as being *decision literals*; this fact will be denoted here by writing l^d (roughly, decision literals are the ones that have been added to M by the **Decide** rule given below). Most of the time the sequence M will be simply seen as a set of literals, denoting an assignment, i.e., ignoring both the annotations and the fact that M is a sequence and not a set.

In what follows, the transition relation will be defined by means of (conditional) transition rules. If F is a cnf formula and C is a clause, we will sometimes write F, C in the second component of a state as a shorthand for $F \cup \{C\}$.

Definition 1. *The Basic DPLL system consists of the following transition rules:*

UnitPropagate :

$$M \parallel F, C \vee l \implies M l \parallel F, C \vee l \quad \text{if} \quad \begin{cases} M \models \neg C \\ l \text{ is undefined in } M \end{cases}$$

Decide :

$$M \parallel F \implies M l^d \parallel F \quad \text{if} \quad \begin{cases} l \text{ or } \neg l \text{ occurs in a clause of } F \\ l \text{ is undefined in } M \end{cases}$$

Fail :

$$M \parallel F, C \implies \text{fail} \quad \text{if} \quad \begin{cases} M \models \neg C \\ M \text{ contains no decision literals} \end{cases}$$

Backjump :

$$M l^d N \parallel F \implies M l' \parallel F \quad \text{if} \quad \begin{cases} \text{there is some clause } C \vee l' \text{ s.t.:} \\ F \models C \vee l' \text{ and } M \models \neg C \\ l' \text{ is undefined in } M \\ l' \text{ or } \neg l' \text{ occurs in a clause of } F \end{cases}$$

Below we will show that the transition relation *terminates* when starting from $\emptyset \parallel F$, that is, there exist no infinite sequences of the form $\emptyset \parallel F \implies S_1 \implies \dots$, and we will define a *Basic DPLL procedure* to be *any* procedure taking an input cnf F and computing a sequence $\emptyset \parallel F \implies^! S$.

Of course, actual DPLL implementations may use the above rules in more restrictive ways, using particular application strategies. For example, many systems will eagerly apply **UnitPropagate**, but this is not necessary; in fact, below we will show that *any strategy is adequate*: the final state produced by the strategy will be either *fail*, when F is unsatisfiable, or else a state of the form $M \parallel F'$ where M is a model of F . This result holds even if **UnitPropagate** is not applied at all. Similarly, most implementations will try to minimize the number of applications of **Decide**. Others may apply it only with literals l belonging to some clause that is not yet true in M (in that case the procedure can also terminate if M is a non-total model).

Example 2. In the following sequence of transitions, to improve readability we have denoted atoms by natural numbers, negation by overlining, and written decision literals in bold:

$$\begin{array}{l} \emptyset \parallel 1\sqrt{3}, \overline{1}\sqrt{4}\sqrt{5}\sqrt{2}, \overline{1}\sqrt{2} \implies (\text{Decide}) \\ \mathbf{3} \parallel 1\sqrt{3}, \overline{1}\sqrt{4}\sqrt{5}\sqrt{2}, \overline{1}\sqrt{2} \implies (\text{UnitPropagate}) \\ \mathbf{3} \mathbf{1} \parallel 1\sqrt{3}, \overline{1}\sqrt{4}\sqrt{5}\sqrt{2}, \overline{1}\sqrt{2} \implies (\text{UnitPropagate}) \\ \mathbf{3} \mathbf{1} \overline{2} \parallel 1\sqrt{3}, \overline{1}\sqrt{4}\sqrt{5}\sqrt{2}, \overline{1}\sqrt{2} \implies (\text{Decide}) \\ \mathbf{3} \mathbf{1} \overline{2} \mathbf{4} \parallel 1\sqrt{3}, \overline{1}\sqrt{4}\sqrt{5}\sqrt{2}, \overline{1}\sqrt{2} \implies (\text{UnitPropagate}) \\ \mathbf{3} \mathbf{1} \overline{2} \mathbf{4} \mathbf{5} \parallel 1\sqrt{3}, \overline{1}\sqrt{4}\sqrt{5}\sqrt{2}, \overline{1}\sqrt{2} \implies \text{Final state: model found.} \quad \square \end{array}$$

Concerning the rules **Fail** and **Backjump**, we will show below that if in some state $M \parallel F$ there is a *conflict*, i.e., a clause of F that is false in M , it is always the case that either **Fail** applies (if there are no decision literals in M) or **Backjump** applies (if there is at least one decision literal in M). In fact, in most implementations **Backjump** is only applied when such a conflict arises, this is why it is usually called *conflict-driven backjumping*. Note that M can be seen as a sequence $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_k M_k$, where the l_i are all the decision literals in M . As in actual DPLL implementations, such a state is said to be in *decision level* k , and the literals of each $l_i M_i$ are said to belong to decision level i .

Example 3. Another example of application of the Basic DPLL rules is:

$$\begin{array}{llll}
\emptyset \parallel \bar{1}\vee 2, \bar{3}\vee 4, \bar{5}\vee \bar{6}, 6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2} & \implies & (\text{Decide}) \\
\mathbf{1} \parallel \bar{1}\vee 2, \bar{3}\vee 4, \bar{5}\vee \bar{6}, 6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2} & \implies & (\text{UnitPropagate}) \\
\mathbf{1\ 2} \parallel \bar{1}\vee 2, \bar{3}\vee 4, \bar{5}\vee \bar{6}, 6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2} & \implies & (\text{Decide}) \\
\mathbf{1\ 2\ 3} \parallel \bar{1}\vee 2, \bar{3}\vee 4, \bar{5}\vee \bar{6}, 6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2} & \implies & (\text{UnitPropagate}) \\
\mathbf{1\ 2\ 3\ 4} \parallel \bar{1}\vee 2, \bar{3}\vee 4, \bar{5}\vee \bar{6}, 6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2} & \implies & (\text{Decide}) \\
\mathbf{1\ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5} \parallel \bar{1}\vee 2, \bar{3}\vee 4, \bar{5}\vee \bar{6}, 6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2} & \implies & (\text{UnitPropagate}) \\
\mathbf{1\ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6} \parallel \bar{1}\vee 2, \bar{3}\vee 4, \bar{5}\vee \bar{6}, 6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2} & \implies & (\text{Backjump}) \\
\mathbf{1\ 2\ 5} \parallel \bar{1}\vee 2, \bar{3}\vee 4, \bar{5}\vee \bar{6}, 6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2} & &
\end{array}$$

Indeed, before the application of **Backjump** there was a conflict: the clause $6\vee \bar{5}\vee \bar{2}$ is false in $\mathbf{1\ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6}$. We have backjumped from decision level 3 to decision level 1, whereas standard backtracking would reverse only the last decision, and return to $\mathbf{1\ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5}$ (decision level 2). The **Backjump** rule applies here because we can take $\bar{1}\vee \bar{5}$ playing the role of the *backjump clause* $C \vee l'$ in the definition of the rule. In fact, one can always take a disjunction of negated decision literals for this (see the proof of Lemma 6). But in practice one can usually find better backjump clauses by *conflict analysis*, that is, by analyzing the so called *conflict graph* (see, e.g., [MSS99]), which in this example expresses why one has both $\bar{6}$ and 6:

$$\begin{array}{c}
\mathbf{1} \rightarrow \mathbf{2} \rightarrow \mathbf{6} \\
\quad \nearrow \\
\mathbf{5} \rightarrow \bar{\mathbf{6}}
\end{array}$$

In this graph, which can efficiently be built backwards from the two conflicting literals, each literal l has incoming arrows from the literals $l_1 \dots l_p$ that caused its propagation due to a clause $\neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_p \vee l$. For finding a backjump clause, it suffices to cut the graph into two parts, one of them containing the two conflicting literals and no decision literals. Let $l_1 \dots l_p$ be the literals with outgoing edges that are cut, let d_k denote the decision level to which each l_k belongs, and let i be the maximal such d_k and j the second maximal one (or 0 if all d_k are i). If only one of the d_k is i , then $\neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_p$ is an adequate backjump clause, and one can backjump to decision level j [MSS99].

In implementations with eager unit propagation such as Chaff [MMZ⁺01], one can always choose a cut that is closest to the two conflicting literals, and that

produces a lemma with exactly one literal of the current decision level, the negation of which is the so-called *1st unique implication point*, (1UIP) [ZMMM01]. In the example, the 1UIP is 5 and the 1UIP cut gives the backjump clause $\bar{2}\vee\bar{5}$. \square

The **Backjump** rule makes progress in the search by returning to a strictly lower decision level, but with the additional information given by the literal l' that is added to it. In most DPLL implementations the backjump clause $C \vee l'$ is added to the clause set as a *learned clause* (*conflict-driven clause learning*). However, in this Basic system the second component of each state (the clause set) remains unchanged; this will change in Subsection 2.3 when the learning rule is added. In fact, for some readers it may be surprising that backjumping can be done without clause learning. Such a distinction gives the system more flexibility, allowing it to model, for example, the original DPLL procedure [DLL62].

2.2 Correctness of Basic DPLL

In what follows, (possibly subscripted) F and M will always denote finite clause sets and annotated literal sequences, respectively.

Lemma 4. *If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^* M \parallel F$ then the following hold.*

1. *All the atoms in M are atoms of F .*
2. *M contains no literal more than once and is indeed an assignment, i.e., it contains no pair of literals of the form p and $\neg p$.*
3. *If M is of the form $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_n M_n$, where l_1, \dots, l_n are all the decision literals of M , then $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_i\} \models M_i$ for all i in $0 \dots n$.*

Proof. All three claims hold trivially initially, so we only need to show that all four kinds of steps preserve them. For claims 1 and 2 this is obviously the case. For the third claim, consider a step $M \parallel F \Longrightarrow M' \parallel F$, where M is of the form $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_n M_n$, and l_1, \dots, l_n are all the decision literals of M .

UnitPropagate: Here M' is of the form $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_n M_n l$. One only has to show that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \models l$, which holds since (i) $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \models M$, (ii) $M \models \neg C$, and (iii) $C \vee l$ is in F .

Decide: There is nothing to be proved here.

Backjump: Assume that, in the **Backjump** rule, l^d is l_{j+1} , the $j+1$ -th decision literal. Then M' is of the form $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_j M_j l'$. We only need to show that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j\} \models l'$. This holds as for the **UnitPropagate** case, since we have (i) $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j\} \models M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_j M_j$, (ii) $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_j M_j \models \neg C$, and (iii) $F \models C \vee l'$. \square

Theorem 5 (Termination). *There exist no infinite sequences of the form $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow S_1 \Longrightarrow \dots$*

Proof. We define a well-founded strict partial ordering \succ on states, and show that each rule application $M \parallel F \Longrightarrow M' \parallel F'$ is decreasing with respect to this ordering, i.e., $M \parallel F \succ M' \parallel F'$.

Let M be of the form $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_p M_p$, where l_1, \dots, l_p are all the decision literals of M . Similarly, let M' be $M'_0 l'_1 M'_1 \dots l'_{p'} M'_{p'}$.

Let N be the number of distinct atoms (propositional variables) in F . It is not difficult to show that p, p' and the length of M and M' are always smaller than or equal to N . Define $m(M)$ to be $N - \text{length}(M)$, that is, $m(M)$ is the number of literals “missing” in M for M to be total. Now define: $M \parallel F \succ M' \parallel F'$ if

- (i) there is some i with $0 \leq i \leq p, p'$ such that

$$m(M_0) = m(M'_0), \dots, m(M_{i-1}) = m(M'_{i-1}), \quad m(M_i) > m(M'_i) \text{ or}$$

- (ii) $m(M_0) = m(M'_0), \dots, m(M_p) = m(M'_{p'})$ and $m(M) > m(M')$.

Comparing the number of missing literals in sequences is clearly a strict ordering (i.e., it is an irreflexive and transitive relation) and it is also well-founded, and hence this also holds for its lexicographic extension on tuples of sequences of bounded length. It is easy to see that all Basic DPLL rule applications are decreasing with respect to \succ if *fail* is added as an additional minimal element. The rules **UnitPropagate** and **Backjump** decrease by case (i) of the definition and **Decide** decreases by case (ii). \square

In the previous termination proof one can observe that DPLL search *progresses* (that is, it makes progress w.r.t. \succ) by adding a literal to the current decision level (by **UnitPropagate**), by adding an additional decision level (**Decide**) or, which is especially interesting, by what the **Backjump** rule does, i.e., adding an additional literal to a previous decision level, even if all the work done in later decision levels is “thrown away”.

Lemma 6. *Assume that $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^* M \parallel F$ and that $M \models \neg D$ for some clause D in F . Then either **Fail** or **Backjump** applies to $M \parallel F$.*

Proof. If there is no decision literal in M , it is immediate that **Fail** applies. Otherwise, M is of the form $M_0 \ l_1 \ M_1 \ \dots \ l_n \ M_n$ for some $n > 0$, where l_1, \dots, l_n are all the decision literals of M . Since $M \models \neg D$, we have, due to Lemma 4-3, that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \models \neg D$. Now consider any i in $1 \dots n$ such that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_i\} \models \neg D$, and j in $0 \dots i-1$ such that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j, l_i\} \models \neg D$. We will show that then backjumping to decision level j is possible.

Let C be the clause $\neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_j$, and note that M is of the form $M' \ l_{j+1} \ N$.

Then **Backjump** applies to $M \parallel F$ as: $M' \ l_{j+1} \ N \parallel F \Longrightarrow M' \ \neg l_i \parallel F$ because for the clause $C \vee \neg l_i$ all three conditions of the **Backjump** rule hold. In fact:

(i) $F \models C \vee \neg l_i$ because $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j, l_i\} \models \neg D$ implies, being D a clause in F , that $F \models \neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_j \vee \neg l_i$. We also obviously have that $M' \models \neg C$.

(ii) $\neg l_i$ is undefined in M' (by Lemma 4-2) and

(iii) either l_i or $\neg l_i$ occurs in a clause of F (by Lemma 4-1). \square

It is interesting to observe that the smaller the j in the previous proof the better, because one can backjump “higher up”. Note also that, if we take i to be n and j to be $n-1$, the **Backjump** rule models standard backtracking.

Lemma 7. *If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! M \parallel F$, then $M \models F$.*

Proof. If $M \not\models F$, then there is some clause C in F such that either $M \models \neg C$ or such that C is undefined in M . In both cases this contradicts that $M \parallel F$ is a final state: in the former case, by Lemma 6 either **Backjump** or **Fail** applies; in the latter case **Decide** would be applicable. \square

Definition 8. *A Basic DPLL procedure is any procedure taking an input cnf F and computing a sequence $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! S$.*

Now, we can prove that our Basic DPLL system, and hence any Basic DPLL procedure, provides a decision procedure for the satisfiability of cnf formulas.

Theorem 9. *The Basic DPLL system provides a decision procedure for the satisfiability of cnf formulas F , that is:*

1. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! \text{fail}$ if, and only if, F is unsatisfiable.
2. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! M \parallel F$ if, and only if, F is satisfiable.
3. If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! M \parallel F$ then M is a model of F .

Proof. For the left-to-right implication of property 1: if $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! fail$ then there is some state $M \parallel F$ such that $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^* M \parallel F \Longrightarrow fail$, there is no decision literal in M and $M \models \neg C$ for some clause C in F . By the case $i = 0$ of Lemma 4-3 we have that $F \models M$, and so $F \models \neg C$. However, since C is a clause in F it follows that F is unsatisfiable. For the right-to-left implication of property 1, if $\emptyset \parallel F \not\Longrightarrow^! fail$, then by Theorem 5 there must be a state $M \parallel F$ such that $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! M \parallel F$. Then F is satisfiable by Lemma 7.

For property 2, if $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! M \parallel F$ then F is satisfiable by Lemma 7. Conversely, if $\emptyset \parallel F \not\Longrightarrow^! M \parallel F$, then by Theorem 5 again, $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! fail$ and hence F is unsatisfiable by property 1. Property 3 is again Lemma 7. \square

The previous theorem does not just prove the desirable properties for a concrete DPLL procedure; rather, it proves the correctness of *any* procedure applying these steps, with *any* strategy. For example, the designer of a practical DPLL implementation is free to choose her own heuristic for selecting the next decision literal in **Decide**, or choose the priorities between the different rules.

Note that we may have $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! M \parallel F$ and also $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow^! M' \parallel F$, for different M and M' .¹ Then, the formula F is satisfiable and both M and M' are models of F . Note that it is not trivial to check whether a state is trivial. Hence, in practice one usually stops when reaching a state of the form *fail* or $M \parallel F$, being M a model of F .

2.3 DPLL with Clause Learning

Definition 10. *The DPLL system with learning consists of the four transition rules of the Basic DPLL system, plus the following two additional rules:*

Learn :

$$M \parallel F \quad \Longrightarrow \quad M \parallel F, C \quad \text{if} \quad \begin{cases} \text{all atoms of } C \text{ occur in } F \\ F \models C \end{cases}$$

Forget :

$$M \parallel F, C \quad \Longrightarrow \quad M \parallel F \quad \text{if} \quad \{ F \models C$$

In these two rules, the clause C is said to be learned and forgotten, respectively. In the following, we denote by \Longrightarrow_L the transition relation defined by the DPLL system with learning.

Example 11. (Example 3 continued). When applying **Backjump**, many actual DPLL implementations learn the backjump clause:

$$\begin{array}{llll} \dots & \dots & & \\ \mathbf{1\ 2\ 3\ 4} \parallel \bar{1}\vee\bar{2}, \bar{3}\vee\bar{4}, \bar{5}\vee\bar{6}, 6\vee\bar{5}\vee\bar{2} & \Longrightarrow_L & (\text{Decide}) & \\ \mathbf{1\ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5} \parallel \bar{1}\vee\bar{2}, \bar{3}\vee\bar{4}, \bar{5}\vee\bar{6}, 6\vee\bar{5}\vee\bar{2} & \Longrightarrow_L & (\text{UnitPropagate}) & \\ \mathbf{1\ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6} \parallel \bar{1}\vee\bar{2}, \bar{3}\vee\bar{4}, \bar{5}\vee\bar{6}, 6\vee\bar{5}\vee\bar{2} & \Longrightarrow_L & (\text{Backjump}) & \\ \mathbf{1\ 2\ 5} \parallel \bar{1}\vee\bar{2}, \bar{3}\vee\bar{4}, \bar{5}\vee\bar{6}, 6\vee\bar{5}\vee\bar{2} & \Longrightarrow_L & (\text{Learn}) & \\ \mathbf{1\ 2\ 5} \parallel \bar{1}\vee\bar{2}, \bar{3}\vee\bar{4}, \bar{5}\vee\bar{6}, 6\vee\bar{5}\vee\bar{2}, \bar{1}\vee\bar{5} & & & \end{array}$$

¹ *Confluence*, in the sense of, e.g., rewrite systems is not needed here.

When backjumping to decision level j , the backjump clause $C \vee l'$ (in the example $\bar{1} \vee \bar{5}$) is always such that, if it had existed the last time the procedure was at level j , the literal l' could have been added by **UnitPropagate**. Learning such clauses hence avoids repeated work by preventing decisions such as **5**, if, after more backjumping, one reaches again a state similar to this decision level j (where “similar” roughly means that it could produce the same conflict). Indeed, reaching such similar states frequently happens in industrial problems having some regular structure. The use of **Forget** is to free memory by removing a clause C , once a search region presenting such similar states has been abandoned. In practice this is usually done if the activity of C (i.e., the number of times C causes some conflict or some unit propagation) has become low [MMZ⁺01]. \square

The results given in the previous subsection for Basic DPLL smoothly extend to DPLL with learning, and again the starting point is the following.

Lemma 12. *If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_L^* M \parallel F'$ then the following hold.*

1. *All the atoms in M and all the atoms in F' are atoms of F .*
2. *M contains no literal more than once and is indeed an assignment, i.e., it contains no pair of literals of the form p and $\neg p$.*
3. *F' is logically equivalent to F .*
4. *If M is of the form $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_n M_n$, where l_1, \dots, l_n are all the decision literals of M , then $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_i\} \models M_i$ for all $i = 0 \dots n$.*

Proof. It is easy to see that property 3 holds. Using this fact, the other properties can be proven similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.

Theorem 13 (Termination of \Longrightarrow_L). *There exist no infinite sequences of the form $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_L S_1 \Longrightarrow_L \dots$ if no clause C is learned infinitely many times along a sequence.*

Proof. The ordering used in Theorem 5 can also be applied here, since, by Lemma 12, atoms appearing in any state are atoms of F . Therefore an infinite sequence of the form $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_L S_1 \Longrightarrow_L \dots$ cannot contain any infinite subsequence of contiguous \Longrightarrow steps, and must hence contain infinitely many **Learn** or **Forget** steps, which is not possible since there are only finitely many different clauses with atoms in F , and no clause C is learned infinitely many times along the sequence. \square

Note that the condition that no clause C is learned infinitely many times is in fact a necessary and sufficient condition for termination. This condition is easily enforced by applying at least one rule of the Basic DPLL system between two successive applications of **Learn**. Since states do not increase with respect to the ordering used in Theorem 5 when **Learn** is applied, any strict alternation between **Learn** and Basic DPLL rules must be finite as well. As with the basic DPLL system, we have the following definition and theorem (with identical proof).

Definition 14. *A DPLL procedure with learning is any procedure taking an input cnf F and computing a sequence $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_L^* S$ where S is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system.*

Theorem 15. *The DPLL system with learning provides a decision procedure for the satisfiability of cnf formulas F , that is:*

1. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_L^! \text{fail}$ if, and only if, F is unsatisfiable.
2. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_L^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system, if, and only if, F is satisfiable.
3. If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_L^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system, then M is a model of F .

3 Abstract DPLL modulo theories

This section deals with procedures for Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT), that is, procedures for deciding the satisfiability of ground² cnf formulas in the context of a background theory T . Typical theories considered in this context are EUF (equality with uninterpreted function symbols), linear arithmetic (over the integers and over the reals), some theories of arrays and of other data structures such as lists, finite sets, and so on. For each of these theories there exist efficient procedures (in practice) that decide the satisfiability, in the theory, of *conjunctions* of ground literals. To decide efficiently the satisfiability of ground *cnf* formulas, many people have recently worked on combining these decision procedures with DPLL based SAT engines. In this section we show that many of the existing combinations can be described and discussed within the Abstract DPLL framework.

In the rest of the paper we consider first-order logic without equality—of which the purely propositional case we have seen until now is a particular instance. We adopt the standard notions of first-order structure, satisfaction, entailment, etc., extended with the following. A *theory* is a satisfiable set of closed first-order formulas. A formula F is *(un)satisfiable in* a theory T , or *T -(in)consistent*, if there is a (no) model of T that satisfies F , that is, if $T \cup F$ is (un)satisfiable. If F and G are formulas, F *entails G in T* , written $F \models_T G$, if $T \models \neg F \vee G$. If $F \models_T G$ and $G \models_T F$, we say that F and G are *T -equivalent*. We extend the notion of (partial truth) assignment M from Section 2 to a set of ground first-order literals in the obvious way. We say that M is a *T -model* of a ground formula F if M , seen as the conjunction of its literals, is T -consistent and $M \models_T F$.

In the following we will use T to denote a background theory T such that the satisfiability in T of conjunctions of ground literals is decidable. To decide the satisfiability of ground cnf formulas we consider again the DPLL systems introduced in the previous section—with arbitrary ground atoms now used in place of propositional symbols—and add new rules for dealing with T . However, in the side conditions of the rules presented in the previous section, entailment

² By *ground* we mean containing no variables—although possibly containing constants not in T .

between formulas is now replaced by entailment in T between formulas. That is, the condition $F \models C$ in **Learn** and **Forget** is now $F \models_T C$, the **Backjump** rule is

$$M \text{ l}^d N \parallel F \implies M \text{ l}' \parallel F \text{ if } \begin{cases} \text{there is some clause } C \vee l' \text{ s.t.:} \\ F \models_T C \vee l' \text{ and } M \models \neg C \\ l' \text{ is undefined in } M \\ l' \text{ or } \neg l' \text{ occurs in a clause of } F \end{cases}$$

and **Decide**, **Fail** and **UnitPropagate** remain unchanged. We point out that the rules of the previous section can now be seen as a particular instance of the new ones if we consider T to be the empty theory.

3.1 A simple example: the classical very lazy approach

One way for dealing with SMT is what has been called the *lazy* approach [dMR02,ABC⁺02,BDS02,FJOS03]. This approach initially considers each atom occurring in a formula F to be checked for satisfiability simply as a propositional symbol, and sends the formula to a SAT solver. If the SAT solver returns a propositional model of F that is T -inconsistent, a ground clause, a *lemma*, precluding that model is added to F and the SAT solver is started again. This process is repeated until the SAT solver finds a T -consistent model or returns unsatisfiable. The main advantage of such a lazy approach is its flexibility, since it can easily combine any SAT solver with any decision procedure for conjunctions of theory literals, as long as the decision procedure is able to generate such lemmas.

The addition of these lemmas can be modelled by the following rule, which we will call **Very Lazy Theory Learning**:

$$M \text{ l} M_1 \parallel F \implies \emptyset \parallel F, \neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_n \vee \neg l \text{ if } \begin{cases} M \text{ l} M_1 \models F \\ \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \subseteq M \\ l_1 \wedge \dots \wedge l_n \models_T \neg l \end{cases}$$

Combining this rule with the four Basic DPLL rules, or with the six rules of DPLL with learning, the resulting Very Lazy DPLL system terminates if no clause is learned infinitely many times, since only finitely many such new clauses (built over input literals) exist. For this condition to be fulfilled, applying at least one rule of the Basic DPLL system between any two **Learn** applications does not suffice. It suffices if, in addition, no clause generated with **Very Lazy Theory Learning** is ever forgotten. The system is also easily proved correct as it is done in the following subsection, by observing that M , seen as the conjunction of its literals, is T -consistent for every state $M \parallel F$ that is final with respect to Basic DPLL and **Very Lazy Theory Learning**. However, in what follows we will focus on other more interesting—and in practice better—lazy techniques, based on tighter integrations between DPLL and theory solvers.

3.2 Less lazy approaches

It is clear that, as soon as a DPLL procedure reaches a state $M \parallel F$ with a (possibly non-total) T -inconsistent M , the corresponding lemma can already be

added. Furthermore, it is also not necessary to restart from scratch once the lemma has been added. These ideas can be modelled by the following rule.

Definition 16. *The Lazy Theory Learning rule is the following:*

$$MlM_1 \parallel F \implies MlM_1 \parallel F, \neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_n \vee \neg l \quad \text{if} \quad \begin{cases} \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \subseteq M \\ l_1 \wedge \dots \wedge l_n \models_T \neg l \\ \neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_n \vee \neg l \notin F \end{cases}$$

The Lazy Theory DPLL system consists of this rule and the six rules of DPLL with learning. In the following, we denote by \implies_{LT} the transition relation defined by the Lazy Theory DPLL system.

Note that the lemma $\neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_n \vee \neg l$ added by an application of the Lazy Theory Learning rule is, by construction, always false in Ml , making either **Fail** or **Backjump** applicable to the resulting state. In practice, one of these two rules is always applied immediately after **Lazy Theory Learning**. This makes the third test in the rule—introduced here to ensure termination—unnecessary.

This DPLL system is still called lazy because it does not consider any theory information until a T -inconsistent partial interpretation Ml has been reached. As we will see, this is the essential difference between these lazy approaches and the DPLL(T) approach that is described in Subsection 3.3 below.

All the results below are proved as in the previous section (see appendix for details). However, the following key lemma is needed to show that for any state of the form $M \parallel F$ that is final with respect to Basic DPLL and Lazy Theory Learning, M is T -consistent and $M \models_T F$.

Lemma 17. *Let $\emptyset \parallel F_0 \implies_{LT}^* M \parallel F$. If M is T -inconsistent then the rule Lazy Theory Learning applies to $M \parallel F$.*

Theorem 18 (Termination of \implies_{LT}). *There exists no infinite sequence of the form $\emptyset \parallel F \implies_{LT} S_1 \implies_{LT} \dots$ if no clause C is learned by **Learn** or **Lazy Theory Learning** infinitely many times along a sequence.*

Definition 19. *A Lazy Theory DPLL procedure for T is any procedure taking an input cnf F and computing a sequence $\emptyset \parallel F \implies_{LT}^* S$ where S is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system and Lazy Theory Learning.*

Theorem 20. *The Lazy Theory DPLL system provides a decision procedure for the satisfiability in T of cnf formulas F , that is:*

1. $\emptyset \parallel F \implies_{LT}^! \text{fail}$ if, and only if, F is unsatisfiable in T .
2. $\emptyset \parallel F \implies_{LT}^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state wrt the Basic DPLL system and Lazy Theory Learning, if, and only if, F is satisfiable in T .
3. If $\emptyset \parallel F \implies_{LT}^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state wrt the Basic DPLL system and Lazy Theory Learning, then M is a T -model of F .

Systems such as CVC Lite [BB04] are concrete implementations of Lazy Theory DPLL. Usually, in such implementations the Lazy Theory Learning rule is applied eagerly, that is, with an empty M_1 , as soon as the current partial interpretation becomes T -inconsistent. Therefore, the soundness and completeness of the approach followed by CVC Lite is a particular instance of the previous theorem.

3.3 The DPLL(T) approach with eager theory propagation

The Lazy Theory DPLL systems we have seen are lazy in the sense that they use theory information only after a theory-inconsistent partial assignment has been generated. In this subsection we describe the DPLL(T) approach [GHN⁺04] with eager theory propagation, which allows the use of theory information as soon as possible. This new information reduces the search space by discovering the truth value of literals otherwise considered to be unassigned. Moreover, it does this without sacrificing modularity or flexibility: combining arbitrary theory decision procedures for conjunctions of literals with a DPLL system is as simple as for the lazy approaches such as that of CVC Lite. The key idea behind DPLL(T) is the following rule:

Definition 21. *The Theory Propagate rule is the following:*

$$M \parallel F \Longrightarrow M l \parallel F \text{ if } \begin{cases} M \models_T l \\ l \text{ or } \neg l \text{ occurs in a clause of } F \\ l \text{ is undefined in } M \end{cases}$$

The DPLL(T) system with eager theory propagation consists of this rule and the six rules of DPLL with learning. We denote by $\Longrightarrow_{\text{Edpll}(T)}$ the transition relation defined by the DPLL(T) system with eager theory propagation where Theory Propagate has priority over all the other rules.

All results as in the previous sections apply here, including termination under the usual assumption (since Theory Propagate also decreases with respect to the ordering \succ used in Theorem 5). The only additional ingredient needed is the following lemma.

Lemma 22. *If $\emptyset \parallel F_0 \Longrightarrow_{\text{Edpll}(T)}^* M \parallel F$ then M is T -consistent.*

Proof. This property is true initially, and all rules preserve it, by the fact that $M \models_T l$ if, and only if, $M \cup \{\neg l\}$ is T -inconsistent: the rules only add literals to M that are undefined in M , and Theory Propagate adds all literals l of F that are theory consequences of M , before any literal $\neg l$ making it T -inconsistent can be added to M by any of the other rules. \square

Definition 23. *A DPLL(T) procedure with Eager Theory Propagation for T is any procedure taking an input cnf F and computing a sequence $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{\text{Edpll}(T)}^* S$ where S is a final state wrt Theory Propagate and the Basic DPLL system.*

Theorem 24. *The DPLL system with eager theory propagation provides a decision procedure for the satisfiability in T of cnf formulas F , that is:*

1. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{\text{Edpll}(T)}^!$ fail if, and only if, F is unsatisfiable in T .
2. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{\text{Edpll}(T)}^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state wrt the Basic DPLL system and **Theory Propagate**, if, and only if, F is satisfiable in T .
3. If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{\text{Edpll}(T)}^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state wrt the Basic DPLL system and **Theory Propagate**, then M is a T -model of F .

In practice, the DPLL(T) approach can be implemented, very much in the spirit of the CLP(X) scheme in constraint logic programming, by building a component DPLL(X) common to all theories, and instantiating it with solvers for different theories T to obtain different DPLL(T) procedures. At each state $M \parallel F$, the theory solver only sees the part M and communicates to the DPLL(X) engine any input literals entailed by M in the given theory. More details on an architecture for concrete DPLL(T) systems can be found in [GHN⁺04].

3.4 The DPLL(T) approach with non-exhaustive propagation

For some theories eager **Theory Propagate** is expensive in an actual implementation. For example, in our experience with EUF, this is the case for detecting input literals entailed by disequations. However, using the information coming from the “cheap enough” applications of **Theory Propagate** is extremely useful for pruning the search space. Therefore one would like to have a combination of **Theory Propagate**, for the cheaper cases, and **Lazy Theory Learning**, for covering the incompletenesses of **Theory Propagate** making the equivalent of Lemma 22 hold. This is actually what is done in the DPLL(T) implementation of [GHN⁺04].

Definition 25. *The DPLL(T) system with non-exhaustive theory propagation consists of the **Lazy Theory Learning** and **Theory Propagate** rules and the six rules of DPLL with learning. We denote by $\Longrightarrow_{\text{NEdpll}(T)}$ the transition relation defined by the DPLL(T) system with eager theory propagation.*

Definition 26. *A DPLL(T) procedure with Non-Exhaustive Theory Propagation for T is any procedure taking an input cnf F and computing a sequence $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{\text{NEdpll}(T)}^* S$ where S is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system and **Lazy Theory Learning**.*

A necessary and sufficient condition for ensuring the termination of the previous system is again that no clause can be learned by **Lazy Theory Learning** or **Learn** infinitely many times. In practice, this can be achieved by the same strategy presented in Subsection 3.2. Hence, we have:

Theorem 27. *The DPLL system with non-exhaustive theory propagation provides a decision procedure for the satisfiability in T of cnf formulas F , that is:*

1. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{\text{NEdpll}(T)}^!$ fail if, and only if, F is unsatisfiable in T .

2. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state wrt Basic DPLL and Lazy Theory Learning, if, and only if, F is satisfiable in T .
3. If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state wrt Basic DPLL and Lazy Theory Learning, then M is a T -model of F .

4 Conclusions

We have presented a declarative formal framework for modeling DPLL-based solvers for propositional satisfiability or for satisfiability modulo theories. We have shown that the essence of these solvers can be described simply and abstractly in terms of rule-based transition systems over states consisting of a truth assignment and a clause set.

The declarative and formal nature of our transition systems makes it easier to prove properties such as soundness, completeness or termination of DPLL-style algorithms. Furthermore, it facilitates their comparison as their differences can be more easily seen as differences in the set of their transition rules or in their rule application strategy.

The approach we presented is as flexible and declarative as the one followed in [Tin02], which first formulated basic DPLL and DPLL modulo theories abstractly, as sequent-style calculi. But it considerably improves on that work because it allows one to model more features of modern DPLL-based engines directly within the framework. This contrasts with the calculi in [Tin02] where features as backjumping and learning can be discussed only at the control level, in terms of proof procedures for the calculi.

References

- [ABC⁺02] G. Audemard, P. Bertoli, A. Cimatti, A. Kornilowicz, and R. Sebastiani. A SAT based approach for solving formulas over boolean and linear mathematical propositions. In *CADE-18*, LNCS 2392, pages 195–210, 2002.
- [ACG00] Alessandro Armando, Claudio Castellini, and Enrico Giunchiglia. SAT-based procedures for temporal reasoning. In *Procs. 5th European Conference on Planning*, LNCS 1809, pages 97–108, 2000.
- [BB04] Clark W. Barrett and Sergey Berezin. CVC lite: A new implementation of the cooperating validity checker. Category B. In *Procs. 16th Int. Conf. Computer Aided Verification (CAV)*, LNCS 3114, pages 515–518, 2004.
- [BDS02] Clark Barrett, David Dill, and Aaron Stump. Checking satisfiability of first-order formulas by incremental translation into sat. In *Procs. 14th Intl. Conf. on Computer Aided Verification (CAV)*, LNCS 2404, 2002.
- [DLL62] Martin Davis, George Logemann, and Donald Loveland. A machine program for theorem-proving. *Comm. of the ACM*, 5(7):394–397, 1962.
- [dMR02] Leonardo de Moura and Harald Rueß. Lemmas on demand for satisfiability solvers. In *Procs. 5th Int. Symp. on the Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing, SAT'02*, pages 244–251, 2002.
- [DP60] Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam. A computing procedure for quantification theory. *Journal of the ACM*, 7:201–215, 1960.

- [FJOS03] C. Flanagan, R. Joshi, X. Ou, and J. B. Saxe. Theorem proving using lazy proof explanation. In *Procs. 15th Int. Conf. on Computer Aided Verification (CAV)*, LNCS 2725, 2003.
- [GHN⁺04] H. Ganzinger, G. Hagen, R. Nieuwenhuis, A. Oliveras, and C. Tinelli. DPLL(T): Fast decision procedures. In *Procs. 16th Int. Conf. Computer Aided Verification (CAV)*, LNCS 3114, pages 175–188, 2004.
- [GN02] E. Goldberg and Y. Novikov. BerkMin: A fast and robust SAT-solver. In *Design, Automation, and Test in Europe (DATE '02)*, pages 142–149, 2002.
- [MMZ⁺01] M. Moskewicz, Conor. Madigan, Y. Zhao, L. Zhang, and S. Malik. Chaff: Engineering an Efficient SAT Solver. In *Proc. 38th Design Automation Conference (DAC'01)*, 2001.
- [MSS99] Joao Marques-Silva and Karem A. Sakallah. GRASP: A search algorithm for propositional satisfiability. *IEEE Trans. Comput.*, 48(5):506–521.
- [Tin02] Cesare Tinelli. A DPLL-based calculus for ground satisfiability modulo theories. In *Procs. 8th European Conf. on Logics in Artificial Intelligence*, LNAI 2424, pages 308–319, 2002.
- [Zha97] Hantao Zhang. SATO: An efficient propositional prover. In *CADE-14*, LNCS 1249, pages 272–275, 1997.
- [ZMMM01] L. Zhang, C. F. Madigan, M. W. Moskewicz, and S. Malik. Efficient conflict driven learning in a Boolean satisfiability solver. In *Int. Conf. on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD'01)*, pages 279–285, 2001.

A Appendix

In the following, the necessary results for showing that the transition systems presented in Section 3 provide decision procedures for the satisfiability in a theory T of cnf formulas will be given. Since the arguments are identical for all systems, only for one of them the complete proof will be presented.

To start with, Lemmas 28 and 29 present several properties that hold in all systems under consideration. However, we will prove a stronger result: all these properties hold for any system constructed using any of the rules presented in the paper. In order to prove this result, consider the system consisting of the 6 rules of the Basic DPLL system with learning for deciding satisfiability in a theory T , and the rules Theory Propagate, Lazy Theory Learning and Very Lazy Theory Learning. If we denote by \Longrightarrow_{ALL} the transition relation defined by this system, we have:

Lemma 28. *If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{ALL}^* M \parallel F'$ then*

1. *All the atoms in M and all the atoms in F' are atoms of F .*
2. *M contains no literal more than once and is indeed an assignment, i.e., it contains no pair of literals of the form p and $\neg p$.*
3. *F' is T -equivalent to F .*
4. *If M is of the form $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_n M_n$, where l_1, \dots, l_n are all the decision literals of M , then $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_i\} \models_T M_i$ for all $i = 0 \dots n$.*

Proof. Since all four claims hold trivially initially we only need to prove that all 9 kinds of steps preserve them. For claims 1 and 2 this is trivial.

For the third claim it is obvious that all four rules of the Basic DPLL system and Theory Propagate preserve it, since the formula in the state is not changed at all. For Learn and Forget this is true because $F \models_T C$ implies that $F \cup C$ and F are T -equivalent. Something similar happens with Very Lazy Theory Learning and Lazy Theory Learning, where the clause learned is clearly a consequence of the theory.

For the fourth claim, consider a step $M' \parallel F' \Longrightarrow_{ALL} M'' \parallel F''$, where M' is of the form $M'_0 l_1 M'_1 \dots l_n M'_n$, and l_1, \dots, l_n are all the decision literals of M' . If rules Learn, Forget or Lazy Theory Learning are used, the claim holds because M'' is M' . For Decide and Very Lazy Theory Learning there is nothing to prove. The remaining rules are:

UnitPropagate: Since M'' is of the form $M'_0 l_1 M'_1 \dots l_n M'_n l$, we only have to show that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \models_T l$, which holds since (i) $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \models_T M'$, (ii) $M' \models \neg C$, (iii) $C \vee l$ is in F' and (iv) F and F' are T -equivalent.

Backjump: Assume that, in the Backjump rule, l^d is l_{j+1} , the $j+1$ -th decision literal. Then M'' is of the form $M'_0 l_1 M'_1 \dots l_j M'_j l'$. We only need to show that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j\} \models l'$. This holds as for the UnitPropagate case, since we have (i) $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j\} \models_T M'_0 l_1 M'_1 \dots l_j M'_j$, (ii) $M'_0 l_1 M'_1 \dots l_j M'_j \models \neg C$, (iii) $F' \models_T C \vee l'$ and (iv) F and F' are T -equivalent.

Theory Propagate: Here M'' is of the form $M'_0 l_1 M'_1 \dots l_n M'_n l$. We only have to show that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \models_T l$, which again holds since we have that (i) $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \models_T M'$ and (ii) $M' \models_T l$. □

Lemma 29. *Assume that $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{ALL}^* M \parallel F'$ and that $M \models \neg D$ for some clause D in F' . Then either Fail or Backjump applies to $M \parallel F'$.*

Proof. If there is no decision literal in M , it is immediate that Fail applies. Otherwise, M is of the form $M_0 l_1 M_1 \dots l_n M_n$ for some $n > 0$, where l_1, \dots, l_n are all the decision literals of M . Since $M \models \neg D$, we have, due to Lemma 28-4, that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \models_T \neg D$. Now consider the minimal i in $1 \dots n$ such that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_i\} \models_T \neg D$, and the minimal j in $0 \dots i - 1$ such that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j, l_i\} \models_T \neg D$. We will show that then backjumping to decision level j is possible.

Let C be the clause $\neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_j$, and note that M is of the form $M' l_{j+1} N$. Then Backjump applies to $M \parallel F'$, yielding the state $M' \neg l_i \parallel F'$. That is because the clause $C \vee \neg l_i$ satisfies all the side conditions of the Backjump rule:

(i) $F \models_T C \vee \neg l_i$ because $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j, l_i\} \models_T \neg D$, which implies, given that D is in F' and F' is T -equivalent to F (by Lemma 28-3), that $F \cup \{l_1, \dots, l_j, l_i\}$ is T -inconsistent or, equivalently, that $F \models_T \neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_j \vee \neg l_i$; furthermore, $M' \models \neg C$ by construction of C ;

(ii) $\neg l_i$ is undefined in M' (by Lemma 28-2);

(iii) either l_i or $\neg l_i$ occurs in a clause of F (by Lemma 28-1). □

Contrary to the propositional case, the property that in final states of the form $M \parallel F$ the assignment M is a T -model of F is not a direct consequence of the previous lemma. In the theory case, the argument is a more elaborate one:

Lemma 30. *All transition systems presented in Section 3 can be used to find T -models M of cnf formulas F . More concretely:*

1. *If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{LT}^* M \parallel F'$ and $M \parallel F'$ is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system and Lazy Theory Learning, then M is a T -model of F .*
2. *If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{Edpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$ and $M \parallel F'$ is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system and Theory Propagate, then M is a T -model of F .*
3. *If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$ and $M \parallel F'$ is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system and Lazy Theory Learning, then M is a T -model of F .*

Proof. In all three properties, if M is not a T -model of F , it is not a T -model of F' either, because F and F' are T -equivalent. Hence, either (i) there is some clause C in F' such that $M \not\models C$ or (ii) M is not T -consistent.

Case (i) is not possible because it contradicts the fact that $M \parallel F'$ is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system: if there is some clause C such that $M \models \neg C$ then by Lemma 29 either **Backjump** or **Fail** applies; if C is undefined in M then **Decide** applies.

As for case (ii), M cannot be T -inconsistent in property 2 thanks to Lemma 22. In properties 1 and 3, if M is not T -consistent then it contains a T -inconsistent set of literals $\{l_1, \dots, l_n, l\}$ and has the form $M' \parallel M_1$ with $\{l_1, \dots, l_n\} \subseteq M'$. Assume that the clause $\neg l_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg l_n \vee \neg l$ is not in F' —otherwise one can reason as in case (i). Since $l_1 \wedge \dots \wedge l_n \models_T \neg l$, **Lazy Theory Learning** applies to $M \parallel F'$. But then $M \parallel F'$ cannot be final with respect to **Lazy Theory Learning**. \square

In order to prove that any of the systems presented in Section 3 provides a decision procedure for the satisfiability in T of cnf formulas, we have first to ensure their termination. In all cases, the necessary and sufficient condition for termination will be that no clause can be learned infinitely many times. Once termination is guaranteed, all systems in Section 3 can be shown to provide a decision procedure for the satisfiability in T of cnf formulas. We only prove this result for the DPLL(T) system with non-exhaustive theory propagation, i.e., Theorem 27 in the paper, because for the other systems the corresponding result can be proved using the same arguments, which are indeed the ones used in the proof of Theorem 9.

Theorem 27. *The DPLL system with non-exhaustive theory propagation provides a decision procedure for the satisfiability in T of cnf formulas F , that is:*

1. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^!$ fail if, and only if, F is unsatisfiable in T .
2. $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system and Lazy Theory Learning, if, and only if, F is satisfiable in T .
3. If $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$, where $M \parallel F'$ is a final state with respect to the Basic DPLL system and Lazy Theory Learning, then M is a T -model of F .

Proof. The left-to-right implication of property 1 can be proved as follows: if $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^! fail$ then there is some intermediate state $M \parallel F'$ such that $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F' \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)} fail$, there is no decision literal in M and $M \models \neg C$ for some clause C in F' . Now, if we consider the case $i = 0$ in Lemma 28-4 we have that $F \models_T M$ and hence $F \models_T \neg C$. But since, by Lemma 28-3, F and F' are T -equivalent and C is in F' we also have that $F \models_T C$ and therefore F is unsatisfiable in T . For the right-to-left implication, if we have $\emptyset \parallel F \not\Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^! fail$, then because of termination there must be a state $M \parallel F'$, final with respect to the Basic DPLL System and Lazy Theory Learning, such that $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$. Then F is satisfiable in T by Lemma 30-3.

For property 2, if $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$ then F is satisfiable in T by Lemma 30-3. Conversely, if $\emptyset \parallel F \not\Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^* M \parallel F'$, then because of termination, $\emptyset \parallel F \Longrightarrow_{NEdpll(T)}^! fail$ and F is unsatisfiable in T by Property 1.

Property 3 is again Lemma 30-3. \square