CS:4420 Artificial Intelligence

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First-Order Logic

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Readings

- Chap. 8 of [Russell and Norvig, 2012]

Pros and cons of Propositional Logic

\+ PL is declarative: pieces of syntax correspond to facts

\+ PL allows partial/disjunctive/negated information
(unlike most data structures and databases)

\+ Propositional logic is compositional:
meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$

\+ Meaning in propositional logic is context-independent
(unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)

\- Propositional logic has very limited expressive power (unlike natural language)
E.g., cannot say "pits cause breezes in adjacent squares" except by writing one sentence for each square

First-order logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains facts,
first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

- Objects: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries, . . .
- Relations: red, round, bogus, prime, brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, . . .
- Functions: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of, . . .

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constant symbols	$KingJohn,\ 2,\ Potus,\ [],\ \ldots$
Relation symbols	$Brothers(\_,\_),\ \_ > \_,\ Red(\_),\ \ldots$
Function symbols	$Sqrt(\_),\ LeftLegOf(\_),\ \_ + \_,\ \ldots$
Variables	$x,\ y,\ a,\ b, \ldots$
Connectives	$\wedge\ \vee\ \neg\ \Rightarrow\ \Leftrightarrow$
Equality	$=$
Quantifiers	$\forall\ \exists$

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence $=$ $relation(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$
or $term_1 = term_2$

Term $=$ $function(term_1, \ldots, term_n)$
or $constant$ or $variable$

E.g., $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart)$,

$Length(LeftLegOf(RobinHood)) > Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn)))$

Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

E.g. $Siblings(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Siblings(Richard, KingJohn)$

$x > 2 \vee 1 < x$

$1 > 2 \wedge \neg y > 2$

Language of FOL: Grammar

Sentence	$::=$	AtomicS $\mid$ ComplexS
AtomicS	$::=$	**True** $\mid$ **False** $\mid$ RelSymb(Term, . . .) $\mid$ Term $=$ Term
ComplexS	$::=$	(Sentence) $\mid$ Sentence Connective Sentence $\mid$ $\neg$Sentence
	$\mid$	Quantifier Sentence
Term	$::=$	FunSymb(Term, . . .) $\mid$ ConstSymb $\mid$ Variable
Connective	$::=$	$\wedge \mid \vee \mid \Rightarrow \mid \Leftrightarrow$
Quantifier	$::=$	$\forall$ Variable $\mid$ $\exists$ Variable
Variable	$::=$	$a \mid b \mid \cdots \mid x \mid y \mid \cdots$
ConstSymb	$::=$	$A \mid B \mid \cdots \mid John \mid 0 \mid 1 \mid \cdots \mid \pi \mid \ldots$
FunSymb	$::=$	$F \mid G \mid \cdots \mid Cosine \mid Height \mid FatherOf \mid + \mid \ldots$
RelSymb	$::=$	$P \mid Q \mid \cdots \mid Red \mid Brother \mid Apple \mid > \mid \cdots$

Truth in first-order logic

Sentences are true with respect to a model and an interpretation

A model contains ≥ 1 objects (domain elements) and relations and functions over them them

An interpretation specifies referents for

variables $\rightarrow$ objects

constant symbols $\rightarrow$ objects

predicate symbols $\rightarrow$ relations

function symbols $\rightarrow$ functional relations

An atomic sentence $P(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ is true in an interpretation iff the objects referred to by $t_1, \ldots, t_n$ are in the relation referred to by P

Models for FOL: Example



Truth example

Consider the interpretation in which

$Richard$ → Richard the Lionheart
$John$ → the evil King John
$Brother$ → the brotherhood relation

Under this interpretation, $Brother(Richard, John)$ is true just in case Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John are in the brotherhood relation in the model

Semantics of First-Order Logic

(A little) more formally:

An *interpretation* $\mathcal{I}$ is a pair $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ where

- $\mathcal{D}$ is a set of objects, the universe (or *domain*)
- σ is mapping from variables to objects in $\mathcal{D}$
- $C^{\mathcal{I}}$ is an object in $\mathcal{D}$ for every constant symbol c
- $F^{\mathcal{I}}$ is a function from $\mathcal{D}^n$ to $\mathcal{D}$ for every function symbol f of arity n
- $R^{\mathcal{I}}$ is a relation over $\mathcal{D}^n$ for every relation symbol r of arity n

An Interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ in the Blocks World

Constant Symbols: A, B, C, D, E, T

Function Symbols: $Support$

Relation Symbols: On, $Above$, $Clear$



$A^{\mathcal{I}} = \mathsf{a},\ B^{\mathcal{I}} = \mathsf{b},\ C^{\mathcal{I}} = \mathsf{c},\ D^{\mathcal{I}} = \mathsf{d},\ E^{\mathcal{I}} = \mathsf{e},\ T^{\mathcal{I}} = \mathsf{t}$

$$Support^{\mathcal{I}} = \{\langle a, b\rangle, \langle b, c\rangle, \langle c, t\rangle, \langle d, e\rangle, \langle e, t\rangle, \langle t, t\rangle\}$$

$$On^{\mathcal{I}} = \{\langle a, b\rangle, \langle b, c\rangle, \langle c, t\rangle, \langle d, e\rangle, \langle e, t\rangle\}$$

$$Above^{\mathcal{I}} = \{\langle a, b\rangle, \langle a, c\rangle, \langle a, t\rangle, \ldots\}$$

$$Clear^{\mathcal{I}} = \{\langle a\rangle, \langle d\rangle\}$$

Semantics of First-Order Logic

Let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ be an interpretation and E an expression of FOL

We write $[\![e]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$ to denote the *meaning of e in $\mathcal{I}$*

The meaning $[\![t]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$ of a term t is an object of $\mathcal{D}$, inductively defined as follows:

$[\![x]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$	$:=$	$\sigma(x)$	for all variables x
$[\![c]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$	$:=$	$c^{\mathcal{I}}$	for all constant symbols c
$[\![f(t_1, \ldots, t_n)]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$	$:=$	$f^{\mathcal{I}}([\![t_1]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}, \ldots, [\![t_n]\!]^{\mathcal{I}})$	for all n-ary function symbols f

Example

Consider the symbols $\mathit{MotherOf}$, $\mathit{SpouseOf}$ and the interpretation $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ where

$$
\begin{array}{rl}
\mathit{MotherOf}^{\mathcal{I}} & \text{is a unary fn mapping people to their mother} \\
\mathit{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}} & \text{is a unary fn mapping people to their spouse} \\
\sigma & := \{x \mapsto \text{Bart},\ y \mapsto \text{Homer}, \ldots\}
\end{array}
$$

What is the meaning of $\mathit{SpouseOf}(\mathit{MotherOf}(x))$ in $\mathcal{I}$?

$$
\begin{array}{rcl}
[\![\mathit{SpouseOf}(\mathit{MotherOf}(x))]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} & = & \mathit{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}([\![\mathit{MotherOf}(x)]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}) \\
& = & \mathit{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathit{MotherOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(x^{\mathcal{I}})) \\
& = & \mathit{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathit{MotherOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\sigma(x))) \\
& = & \mathit{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\mathit{MotherOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\text{Bart})) \\
& = & \mathit{SpouseOf}^{\mathcal{I}}(\text{Marge}) \\
& = & \text{Homer}
\end{array}
$$

Semantics of First-Order Logic

Let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ be an interpretation

The meaning $[\![\varphi]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$ of a formula φ is either $True$ or $False$

It is inductively defined as follows:

$[\![t_1 = t_2]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$	:=	$True$	iff	$[\![t_1]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$ is the same as $[\![t_2]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$
$[\![r(t_1, \ldots, t_n)]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$	:=	$True$	iff	$\langle [\![t_1]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}, \ldots, [\![t_n]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} \rangle \in r^{\mathcal{I}}$
$[\![\neg\varphi]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$	:=	$True/False$	iff	$[\![\varphi]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} = False/True$
$[\![\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$	:=	$True$	iff	$[\![\varphi_1]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} = True$ or $[\![\varphi_2]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} = True$
$[\![\exists x\, \varphi]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}$	:=	$True$	iff	$[\![\varphi]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}_{\sigma'} = True$ for some σ' that disagrees with σ at most on x

Semantics of First-Order Logic

Let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ be an interpretation

The meaning of formulas built with the other logical symbols:

$$
\begin{array}{lcl}
[\![\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} & := & [\![\neg(\neg\varphi_1 \vee \neg\varphi_2)]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} \\
[\![\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} & := & [\![\neg\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} \\
[\![\varphi_1 \Leftrightarrow \varphi_2]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} & := & [\![(\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2) \wedge (\varphi_2 \Rightarrow \varphi_1)]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} \\
[\![\forall x \varphi]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} & := & [\![\neg\exists x\, \neg\varphi]\!]^{\mathcal{I}}
\end{array}
$$

If a sentence is *closed*, i.e., it has no *free* variables, its meaning does not depend on the the variable assignment—although it may depend on the domain:

$$[\![\forall x\, \exists y\, R(x,y)]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} = [\![\forall x\, \exists y\, R(x,y)]\!]^{\mathcal{I}'} \quad \text{for any} \quad \mathcal{I}' = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma')$$

Models, Validity, etc. for Sentences

An interpretation $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ *satisfies* a sentence φ, or is a *model* for φ, if $[\![\varphi]\!]^{\mathcal{I}} = \mathit{True}$

A sentence is *satisfiable* if it has at least one model

Ex: $\forall x\, x \geq y$, $P(x)$

A sentence is unsatisfiable if it has no models

Ex: $P(x) \wedge \neg P(x)$, $\neg(x = x)$, $(\forall x\, Q(x, y)) \Rightarrow \neg Q(a, b)$

A sentence φ is *valid* if every interpretation is a model for it

Ex: $P(x) \Rightarrow P(x)$, $x = x$, $(\forall x\, P(x)) \Rightarrow \exists x\, P(x)$

Note: φ *is valid/unsatisfiable iff* $\neg\varphi$ *is unsatisfiable/valid*

Models, Validity, etc. for Sets of Sentences

An interpretation $(\mathcal{D}, \sigma)$ *satisfies* a set Γ of sentences, or is a *model* for Γ, if it is a model for *every* sentence in Γ

A set Γ of sentences is *satisfiable* if it has at least one model

Ex: $\{\forall x\, x \geq 0,\ \forall x\, x + 1 > x\}$

Γ is *unsatisfiable*, or *inconsistent*, if it has no models

Ex: $\{P(x),\ \neg P(x)\}$

Γ *entails* a sentence φ ($\Gamma \models \varphi$), if every model for Γ is also a model for φ

Ex: $\{\forall x\, P(x) \Rightarrow Q(x),\ P(A_{10})\} \models Q(A_{10})$

Note: As in propositional logic, $\Gamma \models \varphi$ iff $\Gamma \wedge \neg\varphi$ is unsatisfiable

Possible Interpretations Semantics

Sentences can be seen as *constraints* on the set S of all possible interpretations.

A sentence *denotes* all the possible interpretations that satisfy it (the models of φ):
If φ_1 denotes a set of interpretations S_1 and φ_2 denotes a set S_2, then

- $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$ denotes $S_1 \cup S_2$,
- $\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ denotes $S_1 \cap S_2$,
- $\neg\varphi_1$ denotes $S \setminus S_1$,
- $\varphi_1 \models \varphi_2$ iff $S_1 \subseteq S_2$.

A sentence denotes either no interpretations or an infinite number of them!

Valid sentences do not tell us anything about the world. They are satisfied by every possible interpretation!

Models for FOL: Lots!

We *can* enumerate the models for a given FOL sentence:

For each number of universe elements n from 1 to ∞
    For each k-ary predicate P_k in the sentence
        For each possible k-ary relation on n objects
            For each constant symbol C in the sentence
                For each one of n objects mapped to C
                ...

Enumerating models is not going to be easy!

Universal quantification

$\forall \langle variables \rangle \ \langle sentence \rangle$

Everyone at Berkeley is smart:
$\forall x \ \ At(x, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$

$\forall x \ \ P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being each possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
 & (At(KingJohn, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(KingJohn)) \\
\wedge & (At(Richard, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(Richard)) \\
\wedge & (At(Berkeley, Berkeley) \Rightarrow Smart(Berkeley)) \\
\wedge & \ldots
\end{array}
$$

Existential quantification

$\exists \langle variables \rangle \;\; \langle sentence \rangle$

Someone at Stanford is smart:
$\exists x \;\; At(x, Stanford) \land Smart(x)$

$\exists x \;\; P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being some possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of P

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
 & (At(KingJohn, Stanford) \land Smart(KingJohn)) \\
\lor & (At(Richard, Stanford) \land Smart(Richard)) \\
\lor & (At(Stanford, Stanford) \land Smart(Stanford)) \\
\lor & \ldots
\end{array}
$$

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \; \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \; \forall x$ (why?)

$\exists x \; \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \; \exists x$ (why?)

$\exists x \; \forall y$ is not the same as $\forall y \; \exists x$

$\exists x \; \forall y \; Loves(x, y)$
"There is a person who loves everyone in the world"

$\forall y \; \exists x \; Loves(x, y)$
"Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person"

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \; Likes(x, IceCream) \qquad \neg\exists x \; \neg Likes(x, IceCream)$

$\exists x \; Likes(x, Broccoli) \qquad \neg\forall x \; \neg Likes(x, Broccoli)$

From English prepositions to FOL connectives

English	Logic
A and B $\mid$ A but B	$A \wedge B$
A if B $\mid$ A when B $\mid$ A whenever B	$B \Rightarrow A$
if A, then B $\mid$ A implies B $\mid$ A forces B	$A \Rightarrow B$
only if A, B $\mid$ B only if A $\mid$	$B \Rightarrow A$
A precisely when B $\mid$ A if and only if B	$B \Leftrightarrow A \mid A \Leftrightarrow B$
A or B (or both) $\mid$ A unless B	$A \vee B$ (logical or)
either A or B (but not both)	$A \oplus B$ (exclusive or)

A common mistake to avoid

Typically, $\Rightarrow$ is the main connective with $\forall$

Common mistake: using $\wedge$ as the main connective with $\forall$:

$$\forall x \;\; At(x, Berkeley) \wedge Smart(x)$$

means “Everyone is at Berkeley and everyone is smart”

Another common mistake to avoid

Typically, $\wedge$ is the main connective with $\exists$

Common mistake: using $\Rightarrow$ as the main connective with $\exists$:

$$\exists\, x \;\; At(x, Stanford) \Rightarrow Smart(x)$$

is true if there is anyone who is not at Stanford!

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y)$

"Sibling" is symmetric

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y)$

"Sibling" is symmetric

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; Sibling(y, x)$

One's mother is one's female parent

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y)$

"Sibling" is symmetric

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; Sibling(y, x)$

One's mother is one's female parent

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Mother(x, y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; (Female(x) \wedge Parent(x, y))$

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y)$

"Sibling" is symmetric

$\forall x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; Sibling(y, x)$

One's mother is one's female parent

$\forall x, y \;\; Mother(x, y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; (Female(x) \wedge Parent(x, y))$

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

$$\forall x_1, x_2 \;\; FirstCousin(x_1, xt_2) \;\Leftrightarrow$$
$$\exists p_1, p_2 \;\; Sibling(p_1, p_2) \wedge Parent(p_1, x_1) \wedge Parent(p_2, x_2)$$

Dogs are mammals

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Brother(x, y) \Rightarrow Sibling(x, y)$

"Sibling" is symmetric

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; Sibling(y, x)$

One's mother is one's female parent

$\forall\, x, y \;\; Mother(x, y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; (Female(x) \wedge Parent(x, y))$

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

$$\forall\, x_1, x_2 \;\; FirstCousin(x_1, xt_2) \;\Leftrightarrow\;$$
$$\exists\, p_1, p_2 \;\; Sibling(p_1, p_2) \wedge Parent(p_1, x_1) \wedge Parent(p_2, x_2)$$

Dogs are mammals

$\forall\, x \;\; Dog(x) \Rightarrow Mammal(x)$

Equality

Recall that $t_1 = t_2$ is true under a given interpretation if and only if t_1 and t_2 refer to the same object

E.g., $1 = 2$ and $x * x = x$ are satisfiable
$2 = 2$ is valid

E.g., definition of (full) $Sibling$ in terms of $Parent$:

$$\forall x, y \;\; Sibling(x, y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \;\; \neg(m = f) \wedge Parent(m, x) \wedge Parent(f, x) \wedge Parent(m, y) \wedge Parent(f, y)]$$

More fun with sentences

1. No one is his/her own sibling
2. Sisters are female, brothers are male
3. Every one is male or female but not both
4. Every married person has a spouse
5. Married people have spouses
6. Only married people have spouses
7. People cannot be married to their siblings
8. Not everybody has a spouse
9. Everybody has a mother
10. Everybody has a mother and only one

More fun with sentences

1. $\forall x \;\; \neg Sibling(x,x)$
2. $$\begin{array}{l} \forall x,y \;\;\; (Sister(x,y) \Rightarrow Female(x) \wedge Female(y)) \wedge \\ \qquad\qquad (Brother(x,y) \Rightarrow Male(x) \wedge Male(y)) \end{array}$$
3. $$\begin{array}{l} \forall x \;\; Person(x) \Rightarrow (Male(x) \vee Female(x)) \wedge \\ \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \neg(Male(x) \wedge Female(x)) \end{array}$$
4. $\forall x \;\; (Person(x) \wedge Married(x)) \Rightarrow \exists y \;\; Spouse(x,y)$
5. $\forall x \;\; (Person(x) \wedge Married(x)) \Rightarrow \exists y \;\; Spouse(x,y)$
6. $\forall x,y \;\; (Person(x) \wedge Person(y) \wedge Spouse(x,y)) \Rightarrow Married(x) \wedge Married(y)$
7. $\forall x,y \;\; Spouse(x,y) \Rightarrow \neg Sibling(x,y)$
8. $\neg\forall x \;\; Person(x) \Rightarrow \exists y \;\; Spouse(x,y)$
   Alter.: $\exists x \;\; Person(x) \wedge \neg\exists y \;\; Spouse(x,y)$
9. $\forall x \;\; Person(x) \Rightarrow \exists y \;\; IsMotherOf(y,x)$
10. $$\begin{array}{l} \forall x \;\; Person(x) \Rightarrow \exists y \;\; IsMotherOf(y,x) \wedge \\ \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \neg\exists z \;\; \neg(y = z) \wedge IsMotherOf(z,x) \end{array}$$

The Wumpus World in FOL



Interacting with FOL KBs

Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at $t = 5$:

$Tell(KB, Percept([Smell, Breeze, None], 5))$
$Ask(KB, Action(a, 5))$

I.e., does the KB entail any particular actions at $t = 5$?

Answer: $Yes,\ \{a/Shoot\}$ ← substitution (binding list)

Given a sentence S and a substitution σ,
$\varphi\sigma$ denotes the result of plugging σ into φ

Ex: $\varphi = Smarter(x, y)$ $\sigma = \{x/Bart,\ y/Homer\}$
$\varphi\sigma = Smarter(Bart, Homer)$

$AskVar(KB, \varphi)$ returns some/all σ such that $KB \models \varphi\sigma$

Knowledge base for the wumpus world

“Perception”

$\forall\, b, g, t \;\; Percept([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smelt(t)$
$\forall\, s, b, t \;\; Percept([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$

Reflex:

$\forall\, t \;\; AtGold(t) \Rightarrow Action(Grab, t)$

Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$\forall\, t \;\; AtGold(t) \wedge \neg Holding(Gold, t) \Rightarrow Action(Grab, t)$

Note: $Holding(Gold, t)$ cannot be observed, hence keeping track of change is essential

Deducing hidden properties

Properties of locations:

$\forall\, x, t\;\; At(Agent, x, t) \land Smelt(t) \Rightarrow Smelly(x)$
$\forall\, x, t\;\; At(Agent, x, t) \land Breeze(t) \Rightarrow Breezy(x)$

Squares are breezy near a pit:

- Diagnostic rule — infer cause from effect
  $\forall\, y\;\; Breezy(y) \Rightarrow \exists\, x\;\; Pit(x) \land Adjacent(x, y)$
- Causal rule — infer effect from cause
  $\forall\, x, y\;\; Pit(x) \land Adjacent(x, y) \Rightarrow Breezy(y)$
- Neither of these is complete — e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy
- Definition for the $Breezy$ predicate:
  $\forall\, y\;\; Breezy(y) \;\Leftrightarrow\; (\exists\, x\;\; Pit(x) \land Adjacent(x, y))$